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THE CALCULUS OF INSURER LIABILITY IN ASBESTOS-
RELATED DISEASE LITIGATION: MANIFESTATION +
INJURIOUS EXPOSURE = CONTINUOUS TRIGGER
An insidious disease is one that progresses with few or no symptoms to in-
dicate its gravity.' Asbestosis, 2 neoplasia, 3 mesothelioma, 4 and bronchogenic
carcinoma' are all examples of insidious diseases. These diseases have been
contracted, for the most part, by asbestos insulation installers as a result of in-
haling asbestos fibers over a period of many years. 6 Recently, these workers, or
their survivors, have brought numerous suits against the manufacturers of
asbestos-containing products.' In these suits, the plaintiffs typically attempt to
1 STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 637 (22nd edition 1972); --...nr,RLAND's IL-
LUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 785 (25th edition 1974).
2 Asbestosis is a fibrous condition of the lungs which is caused by asbestos fibers
reaching the alveoli, the sac-like space in the lungs. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.,
667 F.2d 1034, 1038 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3716 (U.S. Mar. 9, 1982),
reh'g denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3859 (U.S. Apr. 27, 1982). In Bore! v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.,
493 F.2d 1076, 1083 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974), the development of
asbestosis was described:
The disease is difficult to diagnose in its early stages because there is a long latent
period between initial exposure and apparent effect. This latent period may vary ac-
cording to individual idiosyncrasy, duration and intensity of exposure, and the type
of asbestos used. In some cases, the disease may manifest itself in less than ten years
after initial exposure. In general, however, it does not manifest itself until ten to
twenty-five or more years after initial exposure. This latent period is explained by
the fact that asbestos fibers, once inhaled, remain in place in the lung, causing a
tissue reaction that is slowly progressive and apparently irreversible. Even if no ad-
ditional asbestos fibers are inhaled, tissue changes may continue undetected for
decades. By the time the disease is diagnosable, a considerable period of time has
elapsed since the date of injurious exposure. Furthermore, the effect of the disease
may be cumulative since each exposure to asbestos dust can result in additional
tissue changes.
Id. at 1083.
Neoplasism is "[a] new growth, especially a tumor, either benign or malignant; a
cancer." 2 SCHMIDT'S ATTORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE at N-16 (1981).
4 Mesothelioma is a malignant tumor of the lining of the lungs of the peritoneum,
which surrounds the organs of the gastrointestinal tract. It is well-established that
prolonged inhalation of asbestos fibers causes mesothelioma. The disease can
develop many years after inhalation ceases, and can manifest itself months after it
begins to develop.
Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1038 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See Asbestosis
and Neoplasia, supra note 1, at 490.
Bronchogenic carcinoma is "a carcinoma or malignant tumor which grows from the
epithelium or the lining of a bronchus [one of the two large tubes which conduct air to and from
the lungs]." 1 SCHMIDT'S ATTORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE at B-87 (1981). "Lung
cancer, or bronchogenic carcinoma, is also generally thought to be caused by prolonged inhala-
tion of asbestos. It too can develop and manifest itself long after inhalation ceases." Keene Corp.
v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1038 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
6 See Haley, Asbestosis: A Reassessment of the Overall Problem, 64 J. PHARM. SCI. 1435,
1435 (1975); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1214.15
(6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 686, reh'g denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3716 (U.S. Mar. 9, 1982).
One manufacturer has been named as a codefendant with several other companies in
over 6000 lawsuits alleging injury caused by exposure to its asbestos products. Keene Corp. v.
Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Because many other manufac-
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recover for personal injury or wrongful death resulting from the insidious
disease.' The plaintiffs allege that the manufacturer's failure to warn the
workers of the dangers of the asbestos was the cause of the insidious disease.'
Then, if the manufacturers are found liable, the manufacturers look to their in-
surers for indemnification, based on the terms of insurance policies which the
manufacturers carry.") The language of these policies is ambiguous, however,
as applied to the insidious disease context." Consequently, the courts must in-
terpret the language of the policies." The interpretation that a court adopts will
determine which insurer or insurers are potential indemnitors of the manufac-
turer."
The asbestos-related disease cases" aptly illustrate the difficulties a court
encounters in determining an insurer's liability in insidious disease cases.
Although it is not known exactly how much exposure is required to cause
asbestos-related diseases, exposure to asbestos fibers may occur over a long
period of time." In asbestos-related disease cases, exposure or inhalation may
begin during one policy period, the resulting insidious disease may develop
during subsequent policy periods, and manifestation may occur in yet another
policy period." For an insured asbestos-products manufacturer, different
turers are similarly situated, the number of suits filed provides a telling index to the magnitude of
the problem. By February 1977, Forty-Eight Insulations, an asbestos insulation manufacturer,
had been named in 251 lawsuits that arose out of injury or death as a result of lung diseases caus-
ed by exposure to the company's products. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations,
Inc., 451 F. Supp. 1230, 1233 (E.D. Mich. 1978). By the end of 1978, Forty-Eight Insulations
had been named as a defendant in over 800 such suits. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight
Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1215 (6th Cir. 1980). By the summer of 1979, over 1370 cases had
been filed. Id. By September, 1981, Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc., also a manufacturer of prod-
ucts containing asbestos, had been named as a defendant in approximately 5500 lawsuits in
which the plaintiffs alleged that they had contracted asbestos-related diseases as a result of contact
with asbestos-containing products manufactured by Eagle-Picher between 1931 and 1971. Eagle-
Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 110, 111 (D. Mass. 1981).
g Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
9
 Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1213 (6th Cir.
1980).
" Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1981); In-
surance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1216 (6th Cir. 1980); Eagle-
Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. at 111 (D. Mass. 1981).
" "[T]he contractual terms in issue 'bodily injury' and 'occurrence' are inherently
ambiguous as applied to the progressive disease context . . . ." Insurance Co. of N. Am. v.
Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1222 (6th Cir. 1980). See Keene Corp. v. Insurance
Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
12 See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1222 (6th
Cir. 1980).
" See Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. at 111 (D.
Mass. 1981) ("The Court's interpretation of the policies will determine which insurance com-
pany or companies, if any, must ... pay any damages for the increasingly numerous underlying
maims against Eagle-Picher.")
'4
 See, e.g. , Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980); Eagle-
F:::ther Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 110 (D. Mass. 1981).
15
 Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
16
 Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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products liability insurers are likely to be providing coverage at different points
in the development of each plaintiff's disease." Furthermore, the manufac-
turer may be uninsured during some stages of the disease's development. is
Thus, in insidious disease cases, the courts must identify the insurance
company or companies that are liable to indemnify a manufacturer for the in-
jury caused by the manufacturer's products. To do so, the courts must inter-
pret a standard provision of the manufacturer's comprehensive general liability
policy (CGL) 19 which specifies that the insurer's obligation to indemnify the
manufacturer depends upon when the injury actually occurred. 2° The in-
surance contract" provides no guidance in determining when the injury oc-
" Id. For example, Keene Corp., a common defendant in cases involving asbestos-
related diseases, had four different insurers during the time period from Dec. 31, 1961 to Oct. 1,
1980. Id. at 1053-57. Appendix A. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., another common defendant,
was insured by five different insurers under twelve policies from Oct. 31, 1955 to Jan. 1, 1978.
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1227, App. A (6th Cir.
1980).
18 Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The
manufacturer may be uninsured by choice. Eagle-Picher manufactured asbestos-containing
products between 1931 and 1971 but was insured for asbestos-related diseases only after 1968.
Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. at 111 (D. Mass. 1981). By
contrast, a:manufacturer may be unable to secure insurance coverage: "Insurance companies
know which particular manufacturers over the years have generated a large risk pool of victims
whose disease may become manifest. Carriers, knowing that they would otherwise have to pay
the full unprorated amount of a number of asbestosis claims [if the manifestation theory were
adopted], would most likely. refuse to insure such manufacturers." Insurance Co. of N. Am. v.
Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1230 (6th Cir. 1980) (Merritt, J., dissenting). See infra
text and notes at notes 133-87 for a discussion of the manifestation theory.
" The National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters and the Mutual Insurance Rating
Bureau promulgated revised standard provisions for comprehensive general liability (CGL)
policies effective October 1, 1966. Tarpey, The New Comprehensive Policy: Some of the Changes, 33
INS. COUNSEL J. 223, 223 (1966). These revised provisions were filed with state insurance
departments and were distributed to member companies. Id. One of the principle changes in the
policy was the transition from an "accident" basis of coverage to an "occurrence" basis of
coverage. Id. See infra note 20.
2° The insuring clause of the CGL policy reads as follows:
The Company will pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which the Insured
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or prop-
erty damage to which the insurance applies caused by an occurrence. "Occurrence"
is defined to mean:
...an accident, including injurious exposure to conditions, which results during the
policy period, in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended
from the standpoint of the Insured.
Tarpey, supra note 18 at 223. The Keene court noted: "The language of each [CGL] ... clearly
provides that an 'injury,' and not the 'occurrence' that causes the injury, must fall within a
policy period for it to be covered by the policy." Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667
F.2d at 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
21
 Insurance policies are generally held to be subject to the same rules of interpretation
as are other business contracts. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Shapiro, 270 Ala. 149, 117 So. 2d 348
(1960); Whaley v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 30111. App. 3d 32, 331 N.E.2d 571 (1975); Lang v.
General Ins. Co. of Am., 268 Minn. 36, 127 N.W.2d 541 (1964); Pettid v. Edwards, 195 Neb.
713, 240 N.W.2d 344 (1976); Raymond v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 86 N.H. 93, 163 A. 713
(1932); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 252 N.Y. 75, 168 N.E. 834
(1929); Kelley v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., 252 A.D. 58, 297 N.Y.S. 228 (1937); Bailey v.
Life Ins. Co., 222 N.C. 716, 24 S.E.2d 614 (1943); McCain v. Hartford Live Stock Ins. Co.,
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curred, 22 however, because the standard CGL policy does not clearly specify a
point in the development of an insidious disease at which coverage is
triggered. 2' Because insidious diseases develop over a long period of time, 24 the
courts are not inevitably directed to a particular interpretation of when a
coverage-triggering injury occurs." In their struggle to determine how to ap-
portion liability, the courts have attempted to draw analogies from other cases
in the liability insurance area." Courts have also heard expert medical testi-
mony in order to ascertain when injury occurs."
Courts have formulated three theories for determining when injury oc-
curs, and thus which insurers are liable, in the insidious disease area. The two
most widely accepted theories are the manifestation theory and the injurious
exposure theory. If the court applies the manifestation theory, only the carrier
providing coverage at the time the injury or disease becomes medically
diagnosable is liable for the judgment." In contrast, under the injurious ex-
posure theory, all insurers providing coverage from the time of initial exposure
through the manifestation of the resulting disease are liable to indemnify the
manufacturer." Under the injurious exposure theory, however, an insurer
would not incur liability for any period during which the plaintiff was not ex-
posed to asbestos manufactured by the insured." At least one court has decid-
ed, however, that the adoption of either the injurious exposure theory or the
manifestation theory would defeat the allocation of rights and obligations
190 N.C. 549, 130 S.E. 186 (1925); - Carraco Oil Co. v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co., 484 P.2d
519 (Olda. 1971); Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 206 Or. 298, 292 P.2d 492
(1956); Farmers Ins. Co. v. Miller, 87 Wash. 2d 70, 549 P.2d 9 (1976); Ehlers v. Colonial Penn.
Ins. Co., 81 Wis. 2d 64, 259 N.W.2d 718 (1977). Yet, because of the inequality of bargaining
power and consequent failure of the parties to negotiate at arms length, a few courts have con-
cluded that somewhat different standards of interpretation should be applied in construing in-
surance policies as opposed to other contracts. See Stordahl v. Government Employees Ins. Co.,
564 P.2d 63 (Alaska 1977); Linden Motor Freight Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 40 N.J. 511, 193
A.2d 217 (1963).
22 " Neither the case law nor the terms of the policies lead us directly to a resolution of
the coverage issues raised in this case." Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at
1041 (D.C: Cir. 1981).
" Id. at 15. See supra note 20.
2+ See Asbestosis and Neoplasia, supra note 1 at 487-88, and The Occurrence of Asbestosis Among
Insulation Workers, supra note 1 at 146-47.
26 Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
26 Courts have attempted to draw analogies from the statute of limitations cases which
deal with the "discovery rule," the worker's compensation cases, and the health insurance cases.
See infra text and notes at notes 77-108, 207-24.
27 Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1218 (6th Cir.
1980); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. at 115, 116 (D. Mass.
1981).
26 Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. at 118 (D. Mass.
1981). Manifestation is measured by the date of actual diagnosis or, with respect to those cases in
which no diagnosis is made prior to death, the date of death. Id.
29 Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1225 (6th Cir.
1980).
3° Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1124, 1145 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 686 (1981).
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established by the insurance policies." Instead, the court concluded that either
exposure to asbestos or manifestation of asbestos-related disease during the in-
surer's policy period should trigger coverage under the CGL policy. 32 Thus,
the court adopted the continuous trigger theory.
The theory chosen by a court will affect the manufacturers and the injured
parties as well as the insurers. Depending on the facts of a case, the court's
adoption of either the injurious exposure or manifestation theory could place
the ultimate burden of loss on the manufacturer. If a court's interpretation of
the CGL policy places the loss on a manufacturer, in many cases the manufac-
turer will be unable to satisfy all the claims against it." A manufacturer's in-
ability to satisfy claims, consequently, would harm the injured parties whose
claims would remain unsatisfied, for the injured parties are the ultimate
beneficiaries of the liability policies."
The current volume of litigation centering upon manufacturers' liability
for asbestos-related diseases" requires an equitable resolution of the insurer
liability dispute. Moreover, the number of future suits may far exceed the
number currently filed. 36 The current widespread use of asbestos and products
" Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N: Am., 667 F.2d at 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
32 Id. In addition, the court noted that exposure in residence should trigger insurance
coverage. Id. The human body is continuously exposed to the harmful asbestos particles
previously inhaled, even after current inhalation of such particles has ceased. See supra note 1.
The body's attempt to accommodate the continuous exposure often leads to asbestosis. See id. As
the court in Forty-Eight observed:
Asbestosis occurs when fibrous lung tissue surrounds small asbestos particles in the
lungs to prevent the particles from moving around or causing irritation to neighbor-
ing cells. Ordinarily, this encapsulation of the asbestos particles is a good thing.
However, if too many asbestos particles are inhaled, then the encapsulation process
diminishes pulmonary function and makes breathing difficult. When this occurs,
the disease of asbestosis is said to be present.
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1214 (6th Cir. 1980).
" Granelli, The Asbestos Case Explosion, THE NAT'L Lj., Oct. 19, 1981, 1, col. 1, at 24,
col. 3.
34 Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961,
967 (1970).
" Granelli, supra note 33, at 24, col. 1. One estimate of the volume of asbestos disease
cases now pending sets the number at 12,000 to 15,000 cases, with 5000 cases in the California
courts alone. Id.
36 Id. at 1, col. 1. "Two new federal appellate court rulings and a new medical study
could radically expand the size and number of damage awards for asbestos-related diseases,
already the single largest source of product liability cases in the nation." Id. The Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has ruled recently that seamen and shipyard workers, the vast ma-
jority of asbestos plaintiffs, can use admiralty law to take their cases to federal court and thus
avoid the state statutes of limitations that had cut off many of their claims. White v. Johns-
Manville Corp., Nos. 79-1854, 79-1580 (4th Cir. 1981). The District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals has also expanded the liability of insurance companies in asbestos cases. Keene Corp.
v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981). An American Lung Association
study found that 10 percent of a group of 305 shipyard workers' wives who had never gone into
the shipyards had contracted asbestosis. If the courts were to allow recovery for these secondary
exposure cases, the number of cases filed would certainly increase. Granelli, supra note 33, at 1,
col. 1. One report estimated that the number of lawsuits filed against asbestos manufacturers is
growing at the rate of 400 a month. Court Refuses to Hear Insurers' Asbestos Pleas, N.Y. Times, Mar.
9, 1982, S D1, col. 1, D7, col. 1.
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containing asbestos" will, no doubt, contribute to this increase, as those ex-
posed to asbestos file suits when their asbestos-related diseases become
manifest." Resolution of the insurer liability dispute also will prevent the in-
surance companies from advocating fluctuating theories of liability depending
on the companies' economic interests in the case."
This note will examine the insurer liability dispute in the insidious disease
area by analyzing cases involving asbestos-related disease. After looking at the
language of the comprehensive general liability policy, the discussion will turn
to the case law that illustrates the various theories which courts have used to
allocate liability. The Insurance Company of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations,
Inc. 1° decision will be used to illustrate the injurious exposure theory; Eagle-
Picher Industries, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company" will serve as an exam-
ple of the manifestation theory. Keene Corporation v. Insurance Company of North
America" will be used to illustrate an alternative approach which combines
some of the characteristics of both the injurious exposure and manifestation
theories. In the discussion of each case, the factors considered by the court in
choosing the appropriate theory to apply will be examined. In this regard, the
emphasis that courts have placed on the CGL policy language, on analogous
problems in insurance law, and on public policy considerations will be
scrutinized. Next, the theories which courts have adopted will be compared.
Finally, it will be submitted that in order to protect the manufacturer's
reasonable expectation of coverage, all stages of the injurious process, from in-
itial exposure to manifestation, should trigger coverage under the CGL policy.
Liability should be allocated among all those who voluntarily assumed the risk
of liability during the injurious process. This approach, which was adopted by
Judge Wald in Keene," should be applied by the courts in all future insidious
disease cases involving an interpretation of the standard CGL policy.
I. THE COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY
The dispute between insurance companies and their insureds in insidious
disease cases results from the parties' disagreements over the interpretation of
37 The production of asbestos during the last fifty years has increased by a factor of one
thousand. Reeves, The Carcinogenic Effect of Inhaled Asbestos Fibers, 6 ANNALS CLIN. & LAB. SCI.
459, 461 (1976). There are more than 3,000 known uses of asbestos. See Asbestosis and Neoplasia,
supra note 1, at 492. These uses involve the employment of millions of workers. Haley, Asbestosis:
A Reassessment of the Overall Problem, 64 J. PHARM. SO . at 1435 (1975).
36 A team of medical researchers warned in 1967 that "[t]he [tumors] associated with
current utilization and exposure to asbestos will not be evident until the 1990's." Asbestosis and
Neoplasia, supra note 1, at 494.
39 Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Wald,
J., concurring).
4° 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980).
" 523 F. Supp. 110 (D. Mass. 1981).
47 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3716 (U.S. Mar. 9, 1982),
reh'g denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3859 (U.S. Apr. 27, 1982).
" Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Wald,
J., concurring).
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the various CGL insurance policies issued to the insureds." The parties
disagree on the proper interpretation of when coverage triggering bodily injury
occurred within the meaning of the policies. Thus, when the parties call upon a
court to resolve this dispute,'" the court's determination of insurer liability
depends ultimately upon its interpretation of the CGL policy language. This
section will review the CGL policy and its coverage provisions.
In 1959, the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters and the Mutual
Insurance Rating Bureau undertook to develop a standard form for insurance
policies which protect manufacturers against legal liability." The Bureau's
work was completed in 1966 when it issued the Comprehensive General
Liability (CGL) insurance policy," which continues to be the prototype for this
form of insurance." The standard CGL policy is structured to economize on
insurer time and costs and to simplify the contract language for the insured's
ease of understanding." The CGL policy is widely used 5° for these reasons
and because it facilitates risk distribution by standardizing the type of risk in-
sured."
Because the CGL policy is designed to cover a wide variety of situations,
the policy contains broad language. This broad language fails to address
specifically the complex problems created by asbestos-related diseases." Rights
of the insured and obligations of the insurer under the CGL policy arise upon
the occurrence of a bodily injury." A court, therefore, must ascertain when a
bodily injury occurred in order to determine which insurance company was
4* Id. at 1039; Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at
1216-17 (6th Cir. 1980); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. at
II 1 (D. Mass. 1981).
45
 Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1981); In-
surance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1216 (6th Cir. 1980); Eagle-
Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. at 111 (D. Mass. 1981).
46 Comment, Liability Insurance for Insidious Disease: Who Picks Up the Tab.?, 48 FORDHAM
L. REV. 657, 667 n.50 (1980).
47 Tarpey, The New Comprehensive Policy: Some of the Changes, 33 INS. COUNSEL J. at 223
(1966).
Fordham Comment, supra note 46 at 667 n.50.
49 R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW S 2.10(a) (1971).
50 Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1216 (6th Cir.
1980).
5 ' KEETON, supra note 49, at § 2.10(a).
" Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1981). At
least one commentator believes, however, that the policy language clearly indicates the triggering
event which is prerequisite to coverage. Tarpey, supra note 19 at 223.
Probably the most significant portion of the definition for occurrence is the
phrase "during the policy period." It will now be required, to bring the policy provi-
sion into play, that the bodily injury ... resulted during the policy period. This
should remove problems of interpretation where causative factors operate over a
long time before any harm results and also where the negligent act or the operative
legal fact is far removed in time from the happening of the injury (e.g. a defect in
manufacture, the sale of the product).
Id.
53 Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See
supra note 19.
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bearing the risk of the insured's liability at the time of bodily injury. 54 The
CGL policy attempts to provide a solution by defining "bodily injury" and
"occurrence." "Bodily injury" is defined as "bodily injury, sickness or
disease sustained by any person." 55 "Occurrence" is defined as "an accident,
including injurious exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy
period, in bodily injury. . . "56
 In most suits involving the CGL policy, the
manifestation of an injury and the occurrence which causes the injury transpire
at the same time or in close temporal proximity to one another." Since the oc-
currence and the manifestation of injury occur during the same policy period,
the court can easily identify the insurer whose policy was in effect when the in-
jury occurred.
In cases involving insidious diseases, however, the event that causes the
injury often takes place substantially before the manifestation of that injury."
In fact, exposure to the hazardous material, the development of the disease,
and the ultimate manifestation of the disease may all take place in different
policy periods. 59
 In this situation, it is much more difficult for a court to iden-
tify the insurer or insurers whose policy or policies were in effect at the time
bodily injury occurred.
Whether a court adopts the injurious exposure, manifestation, or an alter-
native theory depends on the court's interpretation of ambiguous CGL
language. In determining insurer liability a court is guided also by contract
principles," medical evidence," insurance law, 62 and public policy considera-
tions. An examination of these factors, in the context of specific asbestos-
related disease cases, is instructive in discovering why a court might choose a
particular insurer liability theory.
" Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at•1040 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
" Id. at 1053-57, App. A; Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc.,
633 F.2d at 1227-28, App. B (6th Cir. 1980).
36 Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1053-57, App. A (D.C. Cir.
1981); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1227-28, App. B
(6th Cir. 1980).
57
 Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
'a Id. at 1040. The asbestos-related disease may be asbestosis, mesothelioma, or lung
cancer (bronchogenic carcinoma). "The physical symptoms caused by these three diseases do not
manifest themselves to an injured individual until years after the initial inhalation of asbestos.
With asbestosis, sometimes 15 or 20 years will pass before an individual develops shortness of
breath and a cough. The waiting period is even longer with those who develop bronchogenic car-
cinoma due to asbestos inhalation." Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 513 F. Supp. 47,
49 (D.D.C. 1981); accord The Occurrence of Asbestosis Among Insulation Workers, supra note 1, at
147-49.
39
 Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
6° Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1981); In-
surance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1218 (6th Cir. 1980); Eagle-
Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. at 115-16 (D. Mass. 1981). See also
supra note 21.
61 Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1218, (6th
Cir. 1980); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. at 114-15 (D.
Mass. 1981).
62 Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1981); In-
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II. THE THEORIES OF INSURER LIABILITY
A. Injurious Exposure
The injurious exposure theory is one judicial interpretation of the CGL's
ambiguous policy language, applied by courts to allocate insurer liability in the
insidious disease area. When a court adopts the injurious exposure theory, the
court deems bodily injury to have occurred upon initial exposure to the
hazard." Therefore, the insurance company whose policy was in effect at the
time the plaintiff was exposed to the hazardous condition is a potential indem-
nitor of the insured manufacturer." As a potential indemnitor, the insurer
must indemnify the manufacturer for the damages the manufacturer pays as a
consequence of injury resulting from the exposure." The insurer is held as a
potential indemnitor even if it no longer covers the insured at the time suit is
brought. 66 These basic features of the injurious exposure theory are illustrated
by Insurance Company of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc. 67
Insurance Company of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc. was a land-
mark decision in the insidious disease area. In that case, the Insurance Com-
pany of North America (INA) sought a declaratory judgment to determine its
liability to indemnify Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc. (Forty-Eight), a manufac-
turer of asbestos products, in its underlying products liability suits." Forty-
Eight faced potential liability because of numerous lawsuits filed across the
country by persons who had inhaled asbestos fibers allegedly manufactured by
the company." The alleged basis for Forty-Eight's liability was that Forty-
Eight had failed to warn asbestos workers and other ultimate users of its prod-
ucts that asbestos was a dangerous product which, if inhaled, could cause can-
cer or other diseases. 7° Forty-Eight had held various products liability insur-
ance policies issued by five different insurance companies, over a twenty-year
period." The issue before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was which of the
insurance companies was obligated to provide indemnification if Forty-Eight
were found ultimately liable." The court found that injury "occurred" shortly
surance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1219-21 (6th Cir. 1980);
Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. at 115-16 (D. Mass. 1981).
" Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1223 (6th Cir.
1980).
" Id. at 1223, 1224.
63 Id. at 1224.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 1212.
68 Id. at 1216.
69 Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1213 (6th Cir.
1980).
70 Id. See generally, Reeves, The Carcinogenic Effect of Inhaled Asbestos Fibers, 6 ANNALS
CLIN. & LAB. SCI. 459; Asbestosis and Neoplasia, supra note 1 (explains development of cancer
caused by inhaled asbestos fibers).
" Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1213 (6th Cir.
1980).
" Id. at 1213-14.
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after the initial inhalation of asbestos fibers." Consequently, the court held
that the insurer providing coverage when the plaintiff was allegedly exposed to
the injurious condition was the potential indemnitor. 74
 In order to choose the
injurious exposure theory, the court had to distinguish the statute of limitations
cases, the worker's compensation insurance cases, and the health insurance
cases from cases involving product liability insurance in the insidious disease
context. The court relied on medical evidence" and on insurance law prin-
ciples of construction" in arriving at its holding.
In the statute of limitations cases, courts often use a manifestation ap-
proach or discovery rule" to avoid the harsh result of a strict application of the
statute of limitations." The discovery rule mandates that the statute of limita-
tions does not begin to run until the plaintiff has in fact discovered his injury, or
until he should have discovered the injury by the exercise of reasonable
diligence." Because a plaintiff usually cannot discover his injury until it has
become manifest, the discovery rule is also referred to as the manifestation
rule. Therefore, under the manifestation rule in the statute of limitations con-
text, a plaintiff is considered injured only when the accumulated effects of the
hazard manifest themselves. 80
 The rule is used to avoid the inequitable result
which would occur if the statute of limitations began to run on the date of a
disease's origin and if the plaintiff were unaware of the disease's presence until
after the limitations period had expired. 8 '
73 Id. at 1222.
74 Id. at 1223, 1224.
75 Id. at 1218.
16 Id. at 1219-21.
" See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 122-25 (1979); Uric v. Thompson, 337
U.S. 163, 170-71 (1949); Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 570, 574-75 (3d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155,
160-61 (8th Cir. 1975); Roman v. A. H. Robins Co., 518 F.2d 970, 972 (5th Cir. 1975); Bore! v.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1102 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869
(1974); Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 1970); R. J. Reynolds To-
bacco Co. v. Hudson, 314 F.2d 776, 780 (5th Cir. 1963); Brush Beryllium Co. v. Meckley, 284
F.2d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 1960); Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Barker, 228 F.2d 842, 847-48 (1st
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 988 (1956); Thrift v. Tenneco Chems. Inc., 381 F. Supp. 543,
546 (N.D. Tex. 1974); Withers v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 878, 881 (S.D. Ind. 1970);
Velasquez v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 97 Cal. App. 3d 881, 889, 159 Cal. Rptr. 113, 118
(1979); Steiner v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 364 So. 2d 47, 48-49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978);
Chrischilles v. Griswold, 260 Iowa 453, 463, 150 N.W.2d 94, 100 (1967); Harig v. Johns-
Manville Prods. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 71, 394 A.2d 299, 300 (1978); Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
117 N.H. 164, 175-76, 371 A.2d 170, 177 (1977); Frohs v. Greene, 253 Or. I, 2-4, 452 P.2d 564,
565 (1969); Gilbert v. Jones, 523 S.W.2d 211, 213 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974).
" Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1220 (6th Cir.
1980).
79
 W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS S 30 (1971).
ri°
 Uric v. Thompson, 337 U.S. at 170 (1949) (quoting Associated Indem. Corp. v. In-
dustrial Accident Comm'n, 124 Cal. App. 378, 381, 12 P.2d 1075, 1076 (1932)).
13 "In the past, defendants have argued that since a disease 'occurs' at or shortly after
exposure to a foreign substance, that is the time when the statute of limitations should start run-
ning. The problem is that such a ruling would bar relief to the many plaintiffs who were unaware
that they were being injured until years later when the disease manifests itself." Insurance Co. of
N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1220 (6th Cir. 1980).
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The Forty-Eight court found the equities in the insidious disease cases
directly opposite to the equities which dictated that the manifestation rule be
applied in latent injury statute of limitations cases." The manifestation rule is
applied in the statute of limitations cases to avoid unfairly barring a plaintiff's
potentially meritorious claim." The Forty-Eight court observed that a mani-
festation rule, if applied in an attempt to resolve the insurer liability dispute,
would inequitably deny coverage to a manufacturer facing future product
liability suits." Manufacturers that have generated a large pool of potential
claimants would be unable to obtain insurance because the insurance com-
panies, knowing they would incur liability on a large number of future claims,
would refuse to insure these manufacturers." Some of the potential claimants'
suits might then effectively be barred by the manufacturer's lack of insurance,
because such a manufacturer most likely could not satisfy all of the claims
against it without insurance coverage."
The Forty-Eight court noted other differences between the statute of limita-
tions issue and the insurer liability issue. The court observed that in insidious
disease cases, it is the injury, not its discovery, that leads to the manufacturer's
liability in the underlying tort suit. 87 This underlying liability should trigger
the insurance coverage as well, the court reasoned, so that coverage would
parallel the theory of tort liability." Furthermore, the identical language in the
statutes of limitation and in the insurance policies did not require identical in-
terpretation, the court urged, because such linguistic uniformity should not
dictate how contracts are interpreted." In essence, the court found that the
statute of limitations cases have no bearing on the determination of insurer
liability.
The Forty-Eight court also found the decisions in the worker's compensa-
tion area to be only minimally instructive. Under the worker's compensation
statutes, employers are strictly liable for their employees' injuries arising out of
82 Id.
" Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1043 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
84 Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1220 (6th Cir.
1980).
85 Id.; See also id. at 1230 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
86 The manufacturer may first go bankrupt in an attempt to satisfy these claims. See
supra note 33.
82 Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1220 (6th Cir.
1980).
88 Id. at 1219. The court asserted:
The underlying theory of tort liability is that the asbestos manufacturers continually
failed to warn the asbestos workers and that, as a result of this, continuous breathing
of asbestos particles allowed asbestosis to progress to the point where it caused death
or injury. The insurance policies ... are comprehensive general liability policies
which are designed to insure the manufacturer against products liability suits. The
contracting parties would expect coverage to parallel the theory of liability.
Id.
88 Id. at 1220. The court remarked: "Linguistic uniformity should not dictate how con-
tracts or statutes arc interpreted. Statutes of limitation are meant to protect defendants against
stale claims, not bar injured plaintiffs who have acted in good faith. Insurance contracts are
meant to cover the insured." Id. (citations omitted).
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their employment, without regard to either the employee's or the employer's
negligence. 9° To allocate the insurers' liability to indemnify the employer,
courts have formulated the "last insurer pays" rule." Under this rule, the in-
surance company that last insured the employer during the injured employee's
term of employment must indemnify the employer. 92 The Forty-Eight court
found this rule inapplicable to insidious disease cases in the products liability
area, even assuming that the rule would apply to worker's compensation cases
involving a progressive disease like asbestosis." The Forty-Eight court noted
that the rule for worker's compensation cases is based on the overriding impor-
tance of efficient administration in that area." In worker's compensation cases,
efficient administration is necessary to provide injured workers with needed,
immediate relief and to avoid the friction between employer and employee that
expensive, complex litigation would cause. 95 The Forty-Eight court observed
that there is a need for efficient administration of products liability insurance
claims. 96
 The court did not consider this need important enough, however, to
override the rules of contract interpretation that are central to a determination
of insurer liability under the CGL policy." The court also suggested that ad-
ministrative considerations are of greater significance in worker's compensa-
tion cases because all that is needed to establish liability in such cases is a work-
related injury." Thus, because the "last insurer pays" rule is premised upon
the courts' concern for efficiency in worker's compensation cases, the Forty-
Eight court did not find this rule controlling in the product liability insurance
context."
The court next considered an analogy to the health insurance cases. In the
health insurance cases, the courts must decide whether a disease began during
a policy period.'°° By the terms of a typical health insurance policy, if the
88 W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS .5 80 at 531 (1971).
91 Travelers Insurance Co. v. Cardillo, 225 F.2d at 145 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 913 (1955). The court in Travelers Insurance Co. v. Cardillo derived the last insurer pays rule
from the "last employer" pays rule. Id. "This [last employer pays] rule ... is the general rule
applicable in worker compensation cases." Id. Illinois has passed specific worker's compensation
legislation to deal with asbestosis and silicosis cases. Under this legislation, the last employer
where the worker was exposed to asbestos is liable. ILL. REV. STAT. ch . 48, S 172.36(d) (1975).
New Jersey law is similar. See Bucuk v. Zusi Brass Foundry, 49 N.J. Super. 187, 139 A.2d 436
(1958).
92 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cardillo, 225 F.2d at 145 (2d Cir. 1955).
93 Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1221 (6th Cir.
1980).
96 Id.
95 SCHNEIDER, 1 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 5 3 (1932).
96 Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1221 (6th Cir.
1980).
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
'°° Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1043 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
The court asserted: "The problem [in the health insurance cases] is to determine when a disease
begins in order to decide whether it began during a policy period." Id.
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disease originated prior to the effective date of the policy, insurance coverage
would not apply.'°' The courts that have considered the health insurance issue
have decided that a disease does not originate until it is capable of diagnosis. °I 2
These courts have held that if a disease manifested itself during a policy period,
then that policy covered the disease even if the origin of the disease could be
traced back prior to the policy period.' 03 The Forty-Eight court urged that the
health insurance cases supported the injurious exposure theory even though the
court conceded that the cases appeared to provide support for the manifestation
theory.'" The court reasoned that the health insurance decisions stand for
strict construction of the policies to promote coverage and for the proposition
that the legitimate expectations of the parties must be honored.'° 5 The court
observed that people buy health insurance policies with the expectation that
they will be protected in case of disability sickness. 106 In addition, the court
stated that it would be unfair to the insured, and contrary to his expectations, if
the health insurance coverage that the insured bought was defeated.'" The
courts' concern with the legitimate expectations of the insured and the courts'
policy of construing insurance contracts strictly in favor of the insured per-
suaded the Forty-Eight court that the health insurance cases were the most in-
structive of the analogous insurance law cases. 108
After the court examined the analogous insurance law cases, it turned to
the expert medical testimony. 109 The district court had heard expert medical
testimony as an aid in determining when asbestos-related injury "occurred" to
trigger coverage."° The court noted that bodily injury, in the form of lung
tissue damage, occurred in substantial contemporaneity with the initial inhala-
tion of asbestos fibers and continued progressively."'
101
 E.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 48 Ariz. 205, 209, 60 P.2d 1070, 1072
(1936); Cohen v. North Am. Life & Cas. Co., 150 Minn. 507, 508, 185 N.W. 939, 939 (1921).
"7 Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F,2d at 1221 (6th Cir.
1980). See, e.g., Royal Family Ins. Co. v. Grimes, 42 Ala. App. 481, 168 So. 2d 262 (1964);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 48 Ariz. 205, 60 P.2d 1070 (1936); Broccolo v. Horace
Mann Mut. Cas. Co., 37 III. App. 2d 493, 186 N.E.2d 89 (1962); Cohen v. North Am. Life &
Cas. Co., 150 Minn. 507, 185 N.W. 939 (1921); Kissil v. Beneficial Nat. Life Ins. Co., 64 N.J.
555, 319 A.2d 67 (1974); Reiser v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 262 A.D. 171, 28 N.Y.S.2d 283
(1941), aff'd, 289 N.Y. 561, 43 N.E.2d 534 (1942). See generally Annat., 53 A.L.R.2d 686 (1957).
" See, e.g., Wilkins v. Grays Harbor Community Hospital, 71 Wash. 2d 178, 427 P.2d
716 (1967); Reiser v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 262 A.D. 171, 28 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1941), aff'd,
289 N.Y. 561, 43 N.E.2d 534 (1942).
104 Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1221 (6th Cir.
1980).
1 °5 Id.
'°6 Id.
107 Id. at 1221-22.
'°° Id.
1 °6 Id. at 1222.
"° Id. at 1217.
11 Id. at 1222. See supra note 2. The district court described the fibrotic process:
Asbestos fibers irritate the extremely delicate lung tissue when inhaled. They
land in the alveoli where it is suspected they cause mechanical damage due to their
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Thus, the court concluded that the medical evidence, " 2 in concert with in-
surance law principles,"s public policy considerations" 4 and the court's inter-
pretation of the policy language," 5 allowed the court to apply the injurious ex-
posure theory. The court observed that the "bodily injury" requirement of the
CGL, according to insurance law principles," 6 could be met by a mere injury;
the abnormal condition need not rise to the level of disease." Thus, the court
adopted an interpretation of "bodily injury" that included the tissue damage
which took place upon initial inhalation of asbestos."s The court commented
that this construction of the insurance policy language maximized coverage in
this case and best represented the intentions of the contracting parties." 9
The court was concerned also with the future insurability of manufacturers.
If the manifestation theory were adopted, the court feared that manufacturing
companies would be unable to buy full products liability insurance coverage, t20
and that potential claims against the manufacturer might remain unsatisfied in
the absence of insurance coverage. 12 ' If manifestation triggered coverage, few
insurers would underwrite protection for an asbestos-product manufacturer
with uncounted exposed potential claimants whose diseases had a high prob-
ability of manifesting themselves in the future ." 2 For these reasons, the Forty-
Eight court adopted the injurious exposure theory. Therefore, in this case, the
coverage provisions of an insurer's policy were triggered only if there was ex-
posure, during the policy period, to an asbestos-containing product manufac-
tured by the insured.
After holding that insurer liability would be determined under the in-
jurious exposure theory, the court turned to the question of allocating liability
once the insurers' policies were triggered. The court held that, in allocating the
cost of indemnification under the injurious exposure theory, each insurer was
liable for a pro rata share.'" This liability was individual and proportionate
stiffness. Additionally, in an effort to cleanse the lung, macrophages attempt to
engulf the fibers. The fibers are too long frequently to be engulfed and the
macrophages die, releasing proteolytic enzymes which further damage the lung.
The end result of this tissue injury and reaction to the asbestos fibers is the forma-
tion of ... scar tissue, which is termed fibrosis.
Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 513 F. Supp. 47, 49 n.3 (D.D. C. 1981).
17 Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1218 (6th Cir.
1980).
" 3 Id. at 1219-20.
114
 Id. at 1221-22, 1223.
'" Id. at 1223.
"6 Id. at 1222 (citing J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE S 355 (1965)).
117 Id. (citing J APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE S 355 (1965)).
" 3 Id. at 1223.
" 9 Id.
120
 Id. at 1219.
" 1 The manufacturer may first go bankrupt in an effort to satisfy these claims. See note
33 supra.
129 Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1230 (6th Cir.
1980) (Merritt, J., dissenting).
123 Id. at 1225.
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rather than joint and several.'" Under the court's formula for allocating in-
surer liability, liability was prorated according to time among all of the in-
surance companies that provided coverage while an injured victim was inhal-
ing asbestos. 125 The court noted that where an insurer could show that no ex-
posure to asbestos manufactured by its insured took place during certain years,
then that insurer could not be liable for those years.'" The court commented
that the manufacturer should be treated as self-insured for those years in which
the manufacturer did not have insurance. Therefore, the manufacturer is
responsible for a pro rata share of the cost of indemnification for those years in
which it was uninsured.'"
Based on the medical evidence,"a insurance law principles," 9 and public
policy considerations,"° the Forty-Eight court interpreted the CGL policy
language in accordance with the injurious exposure theory. Under the theory,
the court held that the coverage provisions of an insurer's policy were triggered
only if there was exposure, during the policy period, to an asbestos-containing
product manufactured by the insured."' The court decided that after an in-
surer's policy was triggered, insurer liability was to be allocated on a pro rata
basis determined by the amount of time the insurer provided coverage while
exposure was taking place as a proportion of the total time of exposure." 2
B. Manifestation
The manifestation theory, like the injurious exposure theory, is a court-
adopted theory for allocating insurer liability in insidious disease cases. When
applying the manifestation theory, a court construes the term "bodily injury"
in the CGL policy to include only bodily injury that becomes manifest during
the policy period.' 33 Consequently, under the manifestation theory, only the
insurance carrier providing coverage at the time the plaintiff's injury or disease
12.1 Id. Under joint and several liability, the manufacturer that is insured by Insurer X
for one year of exposure and insured by other insurers for all the other years of exposure may be
indemnified by Insurer X for the total damages.
"5 Id. at 1224. The formula for determining ultimate liability is as follows:
number of years of exposure
to manufacturer's productsInsurance	 Manufacturer'sduring company X's policy periodCompany X's	 x total
Total number of years of exposurepro rata share	 liability
to manufacturer's products
126 Id. at 1225.
127 Id. at 1224.
128 Id. at 1218.
122 Id. at 1219-21.
15° Id. at 1221-22, 1223.
"' Id. at 1225.
152 Id. at 1224.
135 Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 110, 115 (D.
Mass. 1981).
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becomes manifest is liable to indemnify the manufacturer.' 34
 An example of a
case in which the manifestation theory was adopted is Eagle-Picher Industries,
Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company.'"
The facts underlying the Eagle-Picher case were quite similar to the facts in
Forty-Eight. 196 The plaintiffs in the underlying product liability suits alleged
that they contracted asbestos-related diseases as a result of contact with
asbestos-containing products.'" The duration and timing of Eagle-Picher's in-
surance coverage, however, differed markedly from the insurance coverage
pattern in Forty-Eight. Eagle-Picher manufactured asbestos-containing prod-
ucts between 1931 and 1971. 138 Prior to 1968, Eagle-Picher was uninsured for
the underlying asbestosis and asbestos-related claims.'" During the years after
1971, the company ceased to produce asbestos-containing materials, but it con-
tinued to purchase, and in increasing amounts, insurance coverage for
damages caused by asbestos exposure.'" Eagle-Picher requested a declaratory
judgment to determine the rights, liabilities and obligations of the parties to
these insurance policies."' The defendants were the various insurance com-
panies that had provided Eagle-Picher with comprehensive general liability in-
surance from 1968 to 1979. 142 In determining the defendants' liability, the
Eagle-Picher court examined many of the same factors considered by the Forty-
Eight court."' The Eagle-Picher court examined the medical evidence relating to
the development of asbestos-related insidious disease, 141 insurance law prin-
ciples of insurance policy construction,'" and the expectations of the contract-
ing parties. 146 Although the Eagle-Picher court considered the same factors as the
Forty-Eight court, the Eagle-Picher court reached a different result by adopting
the manifestation theory.
In Eagle-Picher, the medical evidence demonstrated that exposure to
asbestos fibers and injury did not occur simultaneously."' Thus, the court
observed that a central contention of the injurious exposure theorists had been
discredited.'" The injurious exposure theory proponents had argued that ex-
posure and injury occurred either simultaneously, or so nearly so that coverage
for injury could be linked to the time of exposure.'" The court found that some
134 Id. at 118.
133 523 F. Supp. 110 (D. Mass. 1981).
136 See supra text and notes at notes 68-72.
137 523 F. Supp. at 111.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 118.
141 Id. at 111.
142
143 See supra text and notes at notes 110-22.
144 523 F. Supp. at 115.
145 Id. at 115-16, 118.
146 Id. at 118.
147 Id. at 115.
148 Id.
149 Id. See supra text and note 111.
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amount of time necessarily passes before any destructive process begins. 15° The
medical evidence, standing alone, was damaging to the injurious exposure
theorists' argument that exposure to asbestos resulted immediately in coverage
triggering bodily injury.
This important component of the exposure theorists's argument was
undermined further when the court combined its construction of the CGL
policy language with the medical evidence. The court interpreted the CGL
language in light of insurance law principles."' The court noted that any con-
flict between a technical or medical definition of a term in the CGL policy and
the meaning an average person would apply to the term should be resolved in
favor of the layman's viewpoint.'" The court then concluded that a layman
would define injury as manifest, clinically evident disease.'" Thus, the court
excluded sub-clinical damage from the definition.'" The court then suggested
another flaw in the reasoning of the injurious exposure theory proponents. The
court remarked that once the injurious process begins with the earliest sub-
clinical disease, it is not inevitable that clinically evident disease will result. 155
The court observed that the damaging process may cease at any point, even
before producing clinically evident disease. 156 The court commented that the de
minimus scarring of the lungs which can result some time after exposure to
asbestos fibers is not a supportable use of the word "injury" in the context of
the CGL policy.' 57
The Eagle-Picher court found further flaws with the injurious exposure pro-
ponents' interpretation of the CGL language when the court focused on the
literal construction of the coverage clause.'" The coverage clause of the CGL
policies stated that the insurer shall "provide indemnity for all sums for which
the insured shall become legally obligated to pay for damages because of bodily
injury caused by an occurrence." 159 "Occurrence" was defined in the CGL as
"an accident or a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which results,
during the policy period, in personal injury . . . ." 16° The court noted that,
under the CGL policy, liability is caused by a bodily injury, and bodily injury
in turn is caused by an occurrence."' This construction of the CGL policy, the
court remarked, implies that liability, bodily injury, and occurrence, while
necessarily related, are distinguishable. "2 The court further commented that
"° Id.
' 51 Id. at 115-16, 118. The Forty-Eight court also interpreted the CGL language in light
of insurance law principles. See supra text and notes at notes 116-19.
152 Id. at 116.
I" Id.
"4 Id.
"5 Id. at 115.
"6 Id.
'Sr Id.
158 Id. at 113-14.
1S9 Id. at 113.
"° Id.
161 Id. at 114.
162 Id.
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these terms of the policy are distinguishable because each of the elements —
liability, bodily injury, and occurrence — is expected to occur separately in
time.' 63 The court then suggested that bodily injury, which the court had de-
fined as clinically evident disease,'" was the "result" which must occur during
the policy period for coverage to be triggered.' 65 The court observed that in the
definition of "occurrence," the time limiting phrase "during the policy
period" always followed the word "results," and by the phrase's positioning in
the policies it could modify only the word "results.' 166 The definitional
language of the CGL, the court determined, explicitly focused on the result,
rather than on the cause, as the component to which coverage was linked.'"
Thus, the court concluded that insurance coverage was to be provided on a
manifestation basis rather than on an exposure basis.
The court bolstered its conclusion with two further observations. It agreed
with the Forty-Eight court' 68 that insurance policies must be construed in favor
of the insured to promote coverage, 169 and also that the legitimate expectations
of the parties must be honored.'" In Eagle-Picher, as in Forty-Eight, the court
was faced with one construction of the CGL policy that would have provided
coverage and with another that would have left the manufacturer uninsured. 17 '
The Eagle-Picher court observed that, in the case before it, the manifestation
theory was more likely to maximize the insurance coverage provided to the
manufacturer in the underlying products liability suits.'" Coverage was more
likely to be maximized under the manifestation theory than under the injurious
exposure theory because of Eagle-Picher's historical pattern of insurance pur-
chases. As noted above, Eagle-Picher was uninsured during most of the thirty
years up to 1971 during which it manufactured asbestos products. "3 Eagle-
Picher did not purchase general liability coverage until 1968.' 74 The company
ceased production of asbestos-containing materials in 1971.' 75 During the years
after 1971, however, Eagle-Picher continued to purchase, in increasing
amounts, insurance coverage for damages due to injury which was caused by
asbestos exposure. "6 The court suggested that there was a small possibility that
163 Id.
164 Id. at 115.
166 Id, at 114.
366 Id.
167 Id.
368 The Forty-Eight court had noted: "We are bound to broadly construe the insurance
policies to promote coverage." Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633
F.2d at 1219 (6th Cir. 1980).
169 Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. at 118 (D. Mass.
1981).
170 Id.
'" Id.
172 Id.
176 Id.
173 Id.
"4 Id.
'" Id.
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claims based on further exposure to the insured's asbestos would be made. The
court noted, however, that increasingly numerous manifestations of asbestos-
related disease could be predicted with certainty, and these manifestations
would give rise to increasingly numerous claims against Eagle-Picher."' The
court observed that Eagle-Picher had purchased substantial amounts of in-
surance coverage during a period when no exposures to its asbestos products
were taking place.'" Based on this observation, the court reasoned that the ex-
pectation of the contracting parties was that coverage would be provided on a
manifestation, rather than an exposure, basis. 19
In summary, the medical evidence,'" insurance law principles,'" the
legitimate expectations of the parties,'" and the language of the CGL policy
itself s' all led the Eagle-Picher court to adopt the manifestation theory. In
reviewing these factors, the court determined that bodily injury, which triggers
coverage under the CGL policy, had not occurred until it was manifest.'" The
court measured manifestation by the date of the disease's actual diagnosis." 5
With respect to those cases in which no diagnosis was made prior to death, the
court decided that the date of death should be considered the date of manifesta-
tion.'" The court held the insurance carrier that provided coverage on the date
of manifestation liable for the entire amount of the plaintiff's asbestos-related
damages caused by the insured manufacturer. 1 B 7
C. An Alternative Theory: Everybody Pays
An alternative theory, developed by the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia in Keene Corporation v. Insurance Company of North America, 188 com-
bines the characteristics of the manifestation and injurious exposure theories.
Under the Keene theory, labeled by some attorneys as the "everybody pays"
theory,'" inhalation exposure, exposure in residence, 19° and manifestation of
the resultant disease all trigger coverage.'" According to the theory developed
'" Id.
"8 Id.
"9 Id.
180 Id. at 115.
1 " Id. at 115-16, 117-18.
1 " Id. at 118.
1 " Id. at 113-14.
184 Id. at 115.
185 Id. at 118.
188 Id.
'8" Id.
lea 677 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3716 (U.S. Mar. 9, 1982),
reh'g denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3859 (U.S. Apr. 27, 1982).
189 Michael Mealey, managing editor of the Asbestos Litigation Reporter, quoted in
Granelli, supra note 33, at 24, col. 3.
190 Exposure in residence refers to the development of disease while asbestos fibers are in
residence in the body. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1042 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
191 Id. at 1047.
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by the Keene court, "bodily injury," as defined in the CGL policy, encom-
passes any part of the injurious process from the initial exposure to asbestos un-
til manifestation of disease. 192 Therefore, each insurer providing coverage be-
tween the initial exposure and the manifestation of disease is liable to indem-
nify the insured manufacturer. The Keene court formulated its new theory
based upon facts that were similar to the facts in Eagle-Picker and in Forty-Eight.
In the Keene case, Keene Corporation (Keene) sought a declaratory judg-
ment of the rights and obligations of the parties under CGL policies that the
four defendant insurance companies issued to Keene or its predecessors from
1961 to 1980.' 93 Between the years 1948 and 1972, Keene manufactured ther-
mal insulation products that contained asbestos.'" Keene wanted a determina-
tion of the extent to which each insurance policy covered Keene's potential
liability for asbestos-related diseases.'" Keene's potential liability arose from
underlying lawsuits in which insulation workers or their survivors alleged per-
sonal injury or wrongful death as a result of exposure to Keene's asbestos prod-
ucts. 196 Keene believed that its CGL policies covered all potential liability.'"
The defendant insurers offered less expansive views on their respective poten-
tial liability.I 98 Because of the inherent ambiguity in the CGL language' 99 and
the parties' inability to resolve the ambiguity,"° the court was called upon to
interpret the CGL policy.
The language of the CGL policies did not direct the court to adopt one
particular view of insurer liability."' The court explained that, in the context
of asbestos related disease, the CGL terms "bodily injury," "sickness," and
"disease" standing alone lacked the precision necessary to identify a point in
the development of a disease at which coverage was triggered."' The court
sought to interpret these insurance contract terms in a manner which was
equitable and administratively manageable."' In addition, the court noted
that its interpretation of the CGL policy should be consistent with insurance
principles, insurance law, and the terms of the insurance contracts them-
selves."' In its effort to resolve the insurer liability dispute, the court found the
192 Id.
1" Id. at 1038.
194 Id.
' 9' Id.
' 9° Id.
t" Id. at 1039.
' 98 Id. "Aetna. INA, and Liberty Mutual argued that coverage [was] triggered only
when bodily injury manifest[ed] itself during a policy period." Id. According to this theory, only
the insurer providing coverage to Keene when bodily injury manifested itself would be liable.
"Hartford took an intermediate position; [it argued] that coverage [was] triggered by the inhala-
tion of asbestos fibers, but that each company's coverage [was] determined by the ratio of ex-
posure years during its policy period to the entire period of inhalation." Id.
199 Id. at 1041.
200 Id. at 1039.
Id. at 1043.
202
2" Id. at 1041.
204 Id.
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insurance law cases to be only marginally instructive. 20' The Keene court's
treatment of the insurance law cases, cases from the areas of statutes of limita-
tions, worker's compensation, and health insurance, was similar to the treat-
ment of the cases by the Forty -Eight court. 206
The Keene court found the statute of limitations cases not at all relevant to
the insurer liability issue before it. 207 The court noted that the date of a
disease's manifestation or discovery was deemed generally to be the date of the
disease's occurrence for purposes of statutes of limitations. 208 The court com-
mented that if the date of a disease's origin were to begin statute of limitations
periods, meritorious claims would be barred and plaintiffs would be unduly
prejudiced.'" As a matter of public policy, the court suggested, courts had held
that the purpose of the statutes, which was to protect defendants against stale
claims, did not warrant barring such claims. 210 The Keene court reasoned that
neither party to the CGL policy was unduly prejudiced by the requirement that
the bodily injury be found to have occurred during the policy period. 2 "
Therefore, the court concluded, the considerations involved in the statute of
limitations cases had no bearing on the considerations relevant in the insurer
liability cases. 212
The court also regarded the worker's compensation cases as only slightly
relevant in construing CGL policies."' The court stated that those cases, only
some of which adopted the manifestation approach, relied largely on the
legislative intent behind worker's compensation statutes. 214 The cases that
adopted the manifestation approach, the court observed, were based on the
overriding importance of efficient administration in the worker's compensation
system. 2 " The court suggested that administrative efficiency also must be a
concern in determining insurer liability. 216 The court commented that ad-
ministrative efficiency was not important enough, however, to override the
rules of contract interpretation which were central to a determination of insurer
liability under the CGL policy."'
The Keene court found the health insurance cases more relevant to the in-
surer liability question. 218 In the health insurance cases, the courts were called
'°5 Id. at 1043 n.17.
288 See supra text and notes at notes 77-108.
2 ° 7 Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1043 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
208 Id. (citing United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979)). See supra note 77.
2° 9 Id.
"° Id.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id.
2" Id. (citing General Dynamics Corp. v. Benefits Review Bd., 565 F.2d 208, 212 (2d
Cir, 1977) and Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cardillo, 255 F.2d at 145 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 913 (1955)).
218 Id,
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
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to determine when a disease began in order to decide whether it began during a
policy period ." 9
 A court must find that the disease began during a policy
period for the disease to be covered by insurance. 22 ° The rule of the health in-
surance cases, the court observed, is that if a disease manifested itself during a
policy period, than that policy covered the disease even if the disease's origin
could be traced back to a time prior to the policy period. 22 ' The Keene court
asserted that, in the health insurance cases, the security which the health in-
surance policies provided would be undermined if a disease were not covered
by the insurer whose policy was in effect when the disease manifested itself. 222
The courts that had decided the health insurance coverage issue had held that a
manifestation rule was necessary to protect the reasonable expectations of the
insured. 223 Thus, the Keene court reasoned that in product liability insurance
policies, as in health and accident insurance policies, the purchase of the con-
tracts would be defeated if the insured were forced to bear the risk of disease
that was latent at the time a policy was purchased. 224
 After examining these in-
surance law cases, the Keene court addressed the characteristics and purpose of
insurance to aid its interpretation of the CGL policy. The court noted that the
insurance contracts purchased by Keene represented an exchange of an uncer-
tain loss, the possibility of incurring legal liability, for a certain loss, the
premium payment. 225 By issuing the policy, the court observed, the insurer
agreed to assume the risk of the insured's liability in exchange for the fixed
premium payment. 226 The court asserted that when Keene purchased in-
surance, it expected to limit the costs it would have to incur to protect itself
against specified types of losses. 227 In short, the court reasoned, Keene ex-
pected to be indemnified for any legal liability it incurred. 228
 In order to-give ef-
fect to the dominant purpose of the insurance policies, which was indemnity, 229
the court decided that all points in the development of disease must trigger
coverage."° The court commented that, in either of the other insurer liability
212 Id.
2" E.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 48 Ariz, at 209, 60 P.2d at 1072
(1936); Cohen v. North Am. Life & Cas. Co., 150 Minn. at 508, 185 N.W. at 939 (1921).
221 Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1043 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(citing Wilkins v. Grays Harbor Community Hospital, 71 Wash. 2d 178, 427 P.2d 716 (1967);
Reiser v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 262 A.D. 171, 28 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1941), aff'd, 289 N.Y.
561, 43 N.E.2d 534 (1942)).
222 Id. at 1043-44 n.17.
225 Id. at 1045; Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at
1221 (6th Cir. 1980).
224 Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (cita-
tion omitted).
225 Id. at 1041.
226 Id.
227 Id. (citing S. HUEBNER, K. BLACK, JR., & R. CLINE, PROPERTY AND LIABILITY IN-
SURANCE 5-7 (1976)).
226
	 at 1044.
223 Id. at 1041 (citing COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d SS 15:22, 15:41 (2d ed. 1959); 4
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 5 900 (3d ed. 1959)).
23° Id. at 1047.
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theories formulated for interpreting the CGL policy, Keene might be unin-
sured for its legal liability. 23 ' If Keene were uninsured for a part of its legal
liability, the court suggested, then the function of the insurance policies would
be undermined. 232 The court then discussed the injurious exposure and the
manifestation theories and pointed out the flaws that result if either theory is
applied individually.
The court observed that the injurious exposure theory, applied individual-
ly, would undercut the security that Keene hoped to obtain when it purchased
insurance. 233 The court noted that if exposure to asbestos were deemed to con-
stitute a discrete "bodily injury" triggering coverage under the CGL policy,
the subsequent development of disease would be characterized as as conse-
quence of the injury. 2" Since under this theory insurance coverage is triggered
only at the time of exposure, the Keene court suggested that future stages of the
disease's development would not trigger additional coverage. 235 The court
commented that under the injurious exposure theory, a manufacturer that pur-
chased a CGL policy would be insured only against liability for diseases which
resulted from exposure during the policy period. 236 Yet, the manufacturer
would bear the risk of liability for diseases that manifested themselves during
the policy period but occurred as a result of exposure at a time when the
manufacturer held no insurance."' Because of this possibility, the court
asserted that the manufacturer's purchase of insurance would not constitute
the purchase of guaranteed indemnification for liability resulting from asbestos-
related disease.'" The court further stated that the insured would be uncertain
as to its future liability for injuries which began developing prior to the pur-
chase of insurance. 239 Thus, the court concluded that, in light of the basic pur-
pose of insurance, to provide guaranteed indemnification from liability, in-
jurious exposure could not be the sole trigger of coverage. 249
The Keene court also reasoned that, in order to give effect to the purpose of
insurance, manifestation similarly could not be the sole trigger of coverage. 241
If manifestation were the sole trigger of coverage, the certainty of indemnifica-
tion that a manufacturer hoped to obtain when it purchased insurance would
be impaired severely. 242 Only clinically evident disease triggers coverage under
"' Id. at 1044, 1045-47. If Keene had insurance coverage for the entire injurious process
except manifestation, and a court applied the manifestation theory, Keene would be uninsured.
If Keene had continuous insurance coverage after the time of exposure, and a court applied the
injurious exposure theory, Keene would be uninsured.
232 Id. at 1047.
233 Id. at 1044.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 id.
238 Id.
239 Id.
24° Id.
241 Id, at 1046.
342 Id.
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the manifestation theory. 243 The court pointed out that the development proc-
ess of an insidious disease involves a long latency period before the disease
becomes clinically evident. 244 The court observed that insurers know which
manufacturers have exposed potential claimants to hazardous conditions, and
the insurers know when the resulting diseases are likely to become manifest. 245
With this knoWledge, an insurer might refuse to renew the manufacturer's in-
surance coverage, and this non-renewal would leave the manufacturer effec-
tively uninsured. 246 The court commented that this termination of coverage
prior to the manifestation of many cases of disease would deprive the insured of
the protection it purchased when it obtained the insurance policies. 247 If
manifestation were the only trigger of insurance coverage, a manufacturer of a
product known to cause insidious disease probably would be unable to secure
coverage in the future, because few insurers would underwrite the risk where
the pool of potential claimants was great. 24° This difficulty certainly would
arise if the insurer providing coverage at the time of manifestation was liable to
pay the full amount of the claims. 249 The Keene court noted that the manifesta-
tion theory's interpretation of the CGL policy, taken separately, fails to pro-
vide the insured with any certainty of recovery."°
The court remarked that the allocation of rights and obligations estab-
lished by the insurance policies would be undermined if either the exposure to
asbestos or the manifestation of asbestos-related disease were the sole trigger of
coverage."' The court interpreted "bodily injury" in the CGL policy to mean
any part of the single injurious process by which asbestos-related diseases
243 Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. at 116 (D. Mass.
1981).
244 Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
"5 Id.
"[Djuring [the period between the point at which the injurious process begins and
the point at which injury manifests itself], the existence of latent injury among peo-
ple who have worked with asbestos [becomes] predictable with a substantial degree
of certainty. The injury and attendant liability [become] predictable precisely
because it was discovered that past occurrences fare] likely to ... set in motion in-
jurious processes for which ]the insured] could be held liable."
Id. at 1046.
246 Id. at 1045-46.
24" Id. at 1046.
248 Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1230 (6th Cir.
1980) (Merritt, J., dissenting). See note 7 supra for the number of suits pending against various
manufacturers of asbestos-containing products. It is important to recognize that the plaintiffs in
these actions are victims whose diseases have become manifest. See e.g., Keene Corp. v. In-
surance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("The plaintiffs in the underlying
suits allege that they contracted asbestosis, mesothelioma, and/or lung cancer as a result of
[asbestos] inhalation.") Because there are countless other victims whose diseases have not yet
become manifest, the suits pending represent only a small percentage of the total potential
claimants.
249 Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1230 (6th Cir.
1980) (Merritt, J., dissenting).
210 Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
25 ' Id. at 1047.
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developed. 252 The court concluded, therefore, that inhalation exposure, expo-
sure in residence, or manifestation could trigger coverage under the policies. 253
After determining the events that triggered insurance coverage, the court
proceeded to consider the extent to which an insurer was liable to its
policyholder once coverage under the insurer's policy was triggered. The court
concluded that, if an insurer's policy was triggered, then that insurer was liable
to indemnify the insured in full, subject to the policy limits and the "other in-
surance" provisions. 254 The court observed that the policies at issue provided
that the insurance company would pay on behalf of Keene "all sums" that
Keene became liable to pay as damages resulting from bodily injury during the
policy period. 255 The court had defined "bodily injury" to encompass any part
of the injurious process beginning with initial exposure and ending with
manifestation. 256 The court explained that the reason it adopted this definition
was to enforce the insurers' promises to indemnify Keene. 257
 The court be-
lieved that the policies issued to Keene relieved Keene of all potential liability
for latent injury. 258 The court stated that Keene did not expect, nor should it
have expected, that its security was undercut by the existence of prior periods
in which it was uninsured. 255 Asbestos-related diseases, the court noted,
develop over an extended period. 250 As a result, the court continued, when
Keene is held liable for an asbestos-related disease, only part of the disease will
have developed during any single policy period. 25 ' The balance of the develop-
ment may have occurred during another policy period or during a period in
which Keene was uninsured. 262 If an insurer were obligated to pay only a pro
rata share of Keene's liability, the court commented, then Keene's reasonable
expectations of indemnification would be violated. 263 Keene's security would
be contingent on the existence and validity of all the other applicable
policies. 264 The court observed that under a scheme where Keene could obtain
252 Id.
"' Id.
"* Id. at 1050. The court explained the "other insurance" provisions:
"When more than one policy applies to a loss, the 'other insurance' provisions of each policy pro-
vide a scheme by which the insurers' liability is to be apportioned." Id. A policy might read:
"When both this insurance and other insurance apply to the loss on the same basis, whether
primary, excessive or contingent, [this insurance company] shall not be liable under this policy
for a greater proportion of the loss than stated in the applicable contribution provision. . . ." Id.
The policy was one from the Insurance Co. of North America. Id.
255 Id. at 1047.
236 Id.
"' Id.
258 Id.
268 Id.
268 Id. at 1040 n.9. See Asbestosis and Neoplasia supra note 1 at 487-88 and The Occurrence of
Asbestosis Among Insulation Workers, supra note 1 at 146-47 (both articles describe the development
of asbestos-related disease).
261 Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
262 Id.
263 Id. at 1047-48. See supra note 125.
264 Id. at 1048.
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only pro rata indemnification from an insurer, each policy would fail to serve
its function of relieving Keene's entire risk of liability. 265 For these reasons the
court concluded that, under the terms of the policies, an insurer whose
coverage was triggered was liable to Keene up to its policy's limits, subject to
the "other insurance" clauses.
In holding each insurer fully liable to Keene, the court explained that it
did not mean that a single insurer would be burdened with full liability for any
injury . 266 The court noted that the "other insurance" provisions of each in-
surance policy provided a scheme by which the insurers' liability was to be ap-
portioned.'" The "other insurance" provisions guarantee that a single insurer
will not be saddled with full liability for an injury when more than one policy
applies to a loss. 268 The court observed that these provisions of the policies
must govern the allocation of liability among the insurers in any particular case
of asbestos-related disease. 269 The court commented that insurers whose
policies were triggered could collect also from one another under the doctrine of
contribution . 2"
Under the court's opinion in Keene, the CGL policies' coverage was trig-
gered by any part of the injurious process from initial exposure to asbestos
through manifestation of disease. 2" Keene was able to collect the full amount
of indemnity that it was due from any insurer whose coverage was triggered. 2"
The insurers were then responsible for allocating liability among themselves
according to the "other insurance" provisions of their policies 273 and according
to the doctrine of contribution. 274
Judge Wald's partial concurrence in Keene agreed with the majority's
definition of coverage-triggering "bodily injury" 273 but disagreed with the ma-
jority's allocation of insurer liability. 276 The majority had exempted asbestos
manufacturers from all financial responsibility arising from a suit if the
manufacturer had purchased insurance which covered any part of the injurious
process. 277 Judge Wald believed that a manufacturer should bear a portion of
the loss if it was voluntarily uninsured for a part of the injurious process. 278
Judge Wald commented that an asbestos manufacturer that had decided not to
263 Id.
266 Id. at 1050.
262 Id.
269 Id.
269 Id.
229 Id. at 1050 n.35.
2" Id. at 1047.
472 Id. at 1050.
"3 Id.
27+ Id. at 1050 n.35.
229 Id. at 1058 (Wald, J., concurring).
276 Id. (Wald, J., concurring).
2" Id. (Wald, J., concurring).
278 Id, (Wald, J., concurring).
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insure itself during part of the injurious process should not reasonably expect to
be exempt from liability for injuries that were occurring during the uninsured
period. 279 The concurrence urged that manufacturers who voluntarily assume
risk during a period when the diseases are developing must share the respon-
sibility for the judgment. 28° By not obtaining insurance during the entire in-
jurious process, the manufacturer assumed the risk of liability for asbestos-
related disease. 28 ' Judge Wald concluded that the manufacturer should be
treated as an insurer providing coverage for that part of the injurious process
during which it was voluntarily uninsured. 282 Judge Wald noted that allowing
a manufacturer who purchases insurance only intermittently during the in-
jurious process to escape liability altogether would provide a disincentive to
purchasing full insurance protection. 283 If such a manufacturer escapes liabili-
ty, the concurrence observed, then the manufacturer that purchases insurance
sporadically would be as fully insured as those manufacturers that purchase in-
surance continually. 284 Thus, for the manufacturer to be entitled to full indem-
nification, the concurrence asserted, the manufacturer must have purchased
insurance coverage continuously throughout the injurious process. 2"
In essence, Judge Wald agreed with the majority that all stages of the in-
jurious process should trigger coverage. 286 If the manufacturer held insurance
during any part of the injurious process, then that insurance would be trig-
gered. The Keene court noted that its definition of coverage-triggering "bodily
injury" guarantees the certainty of coverage that manufacturers seek when
they purchase insurance. 287 Judge Wald disagreed with the majority regarding
its liability allocation scheme. 288 The majority believed that an insured was free
from all liability if it held coverage during any part of the injurious process. 288
Judge Wald asserted that a manufacturer should not be exempted from all
liability if it was voluntarily uninsured for any part of the injurious process 2"
and if it had no reasonable expectation of full coverage. 291 If the manufacturer
was voluntarily uninsured for part of the injurious process, and if it had no
reasonable expectation of full coverage, then the manufacturer, Judge Wald
argued, should bear a portion of the liability for the part of the injurious proc-
ess during which it was uninsured. 292
279 Id. (Wald, J., concurring).
280 Id. (Wald, J., concurring).
281 Id. (Wald, J., concurring).
282 Id. (Wald, J., concurring).
285 Id. (Wald, J., concurring).
284 Id. (Wald, J., concurring).
285
 Id. (Wald, J., concurring).
286 Id. (Wald, J., concurring).
187 Id. at 1047.
288 Id. at 1058 (Wald, J., concurring).
289 Id. at 1047.
290 Id. at 1058 (Wald, J., concurring).
291 Id. (Wald, J., concurring).
292 Id. (Wald, J., concurring).
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III. CONTINUOUS TRIGGERING OF COVERAGES AND PRO RATA ALLOCATION
OF LIABILITY
Of the three theories for allocating insurers' liability under the CGL
policy in insidious disease cases, the most equitable is that articulated by Judge
Wald in Keene. Under Judge Wald's approach, the entire injurious process trig-
gers coverage, but with certain limitations on the extent of each insurer's
liability. "Bodily injury," which triggers coverage under the CGL policy, is
defined to include exposure to the hazard, exposure in residence, and
manifestation of the resultant disease."' The ultimate liability for an insidious
disease judgment is allocated among the various insurers who are found
liable.'" This insurer liability theory both honors the legitimate expectations of
the insured manufacturer that it will be entitled to recover from an insurer and
acknowledges that insurers are engaged in a profit-seeking activity. In addi-
tion, the theory avoids pitfalls encountered when either the injurious exposure
theory or the manifestation theory is adopted separately. Judge Wald's ap-
proach can be applied consistently, while maintaining due regard for the
reasonable expectations of the parties.
As the Keene court noted, one flaw of both the manifestation 295 and in-
jurious exposure296 theories is that they do not provide the certainty of coverage
which is a basic goal of liability insurance. 297
 Under the injurious exposure
theory, "bodily injury" is deemed to occur only at the time of exposure. 299
Thus, coverage is triggered only at the time of exposure. 299 If a manufacturer
purchased a CGL policy immediately after many persons were exposed to the
manufacturer's hazardous product, the manufacturer would remain complete-
ly uninsured for the liability that would result from these exposures. The
manufacturer's legitimate expectation that the insurance policy would cover at
least a portion of the manufacturer's liability would be defeated. Similarly, a
court's adoption of the manifestation theory may leave the manufacturer unin-
sured, thus nullifying the certainty of coverage which the manufacturer hoped
to obtain by purchasing insurance. Under the manifestation theory, coverage-
triggering "bodily injury" includes only clinically evident disease.'" There-
fore, the manufacturer that holds insurance throughout the injurious process,
but whose insurance coverage is terminated before manifestation, is totally
without coverage for the ensuring claims. As the Keene court observed, the long
293 Id. at 1047.
294 Id. at 1050.
295 See supra text and notes at notes 241-49.
296 See supra text and notes at notes 233-40..
297 Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
298 Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1223 (6th Cir.
1980).
299 Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
'°° Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. at 116 (D. Mass.
1981).
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latency period before an insidious disease's manifestation permits insurers to
avoid liability by failing to renew the manufacturer's policy. 3°' Insurers know
which manufacturers have exposed potential claimants to hazardous condi-
tions, 302 and they know when the resulting diseases are likely to become
manifest. 3" By refusing to renew insurance coverage at a time before the mani-
festation of diseases, the insurer can effectively shift liability from itself back to
the manufacturer. This process of shifting the loss to the manufacturer defeats
the manufacturer's legitimate expectation of coverage. 3" The inability of both
the injurious exposure theory and the manifestation theory to provide certainty
of coverage is one reason why these theories are inadequate.
The Keene continuous trigger theory avoids one flaw of the other two
theories by providing certainty of coverage to the manufacturer. 305 Coverage is
uncertain under the other two theories because coverage is triggered only at
specified points in the injurious process. 306 Under the continuous trigger
theory, by contrast, coverage is triggered throughout the injurious process."'
Thus, the manufacturer can be certain that the policies it purchases during any
part of the injurious process will provide a measure of coverage. Similarly, in-
surance companies cannot avoid liability under the continuous trigger theory
by refusing to renew a manufacturer's policy."' The insurer's policy already
would be triggered, under the continuous trigger theory, since the policy had
been effective during a portion of the injurious process. In addition, the court
could hold the previous insurer that denied the manufacturer's continued
coverage liable for the full amount of the damages. 309
Another flaw of the injurious exposure and manifestation theories is that
30 ' Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
302 Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1230 (6th Cir.
1980) (Merritt, J., dissenting).
303
	
Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
"4 Id. If the manufacturer's coverage is terminated prior to the manifestation of
diseases, the manufacturer most likely would not be able to secure adequate insurance protection
in the future. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1230 (6th
Cir. 1980) (Merritt, J., dissenting). Under the manifestation theory, the insurer providing
coverage at the time of the manifestation of diseases must pay the full amount of the claims. Id.;
Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. at 118 (D. Mass. 1981).
Therefore, few carriers would underwrite the risk where the pool of potential claimants is great.
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1230 (6th Cir. 1980)
(Merritt, J., dissenting). Once again, the manufacturer's legitimate expectation of coverage is
defeated because the manufacturer must bear the entire risk of liability.
3" Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
3°5 Insurance coverage attaches only at the time of exposure under the injurious ex-
posure theory. Id. at 1044. If the manifestation theory is applied, the insurer providing coverage
at the time of the insidious disease's manifestation is liable for the entire amount of the claim. In-
surance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1230 (6th Cir, 1980) (Mer-
ritt, J., dissenting); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. at 118
(D. Mass. 1981).
307 Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
3°8 supra text and notes at notes 300-03 (discussion of the loss shifting problem).
3°9 See infra text and notes at notes 342-45.
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adoption of either theory, by a court, will lead to either inconsistent or inequit-
able results in later cases. Such results are likely in cases where the timing of
the manufacturer's insurance coverage differs from the timing involved in the
court's original decision. Both the Forty-Eight court, which adopted the in-
jurious exposure theory, and the Eagle-Picher court, which adopted the
manifestation theory, construed the CGL policies to promote coverage. 3 " Un-
fortunately, a court's adherence to a general policy goal of promoting coverage
will lead to inconsistent results in subsequent cases. In addition, if the court
decides not to pursue the public policy goal of promoting coverage in a later
case, inequitable results would follow. The Eagle-Picher decision serves as an il-
lustration of the dilemma facing the courts. The manufacturer in Eagle-Picher
was uninsured prior to 1968, 3 " even though Eagle-Picher had manufactured
asbestos-containing products since 1931. 312
 The court determined insurer
liability based on the manifestation theory. 313
 The Eagle-Picher court relied upon
insurance law principles of construction 3 " which explicitly serve public policy
goals, the medical evidence relating to the development of asbestos-related
disease, 315 and the expectations of the contracting parties 316 in reaching its deci-
sion. If a similar situation is presented to the court in the future with the single
difference that the manufacturer was insured until 1968 and uninsured
thereafter, the court will be confronted with a difficult choice. If the court
follows precedent and adheres to the manifestation theory, the manufacturer
would be uninsured for the manifestations of disease that occurred after 1968,
and the potential litigants' claims would remain unsatisfied. This result would
be inequitable because the insurance coverage that the manufacturer held for
thirty-seven years of the injurious process would be rendered nugatory. In con-
trast, if the court were to construe the insurance policies to promote coverage,
the court would have to apply the injurious exposure theory. The decision to
adopt the injurious exposure theory, however, would be inconsistent with the
court's prior adoption of the manifestation theory.
Without more guidance from the courts, it is impossible to ascertain
whether the courts will adhere to their original insurer liability decisions, or
whether they will adopt inconsistent theories in an attempt to promote
coverage. Both the Eagle-Picher court and the Forty-Eight court relied heavily on
the public policy objective of maximizing the insured's coverage in adopting a
"0 Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1219, 1221
(6th Cir. 1980); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. at 118 (D.
Mass. 1981).
"' Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. at 111 (D. Mass.
1981).
912 Id.
3" Id. at 118.
31 Id. at 114-15, 118.
3" Id. at 115.
316 Id. at 118.
July 1982]	 INSURER LIABILITY	 1171
particular theory of insurer liability.'" Both courts also relied, however, upon
medical evidence and the literal construction of the policy language, independ-
ent of the courts' desire to maximize coverage.'" A court's reliance upon these
other factors would necessitate adhering to the previously adopted insurer
liability theory in future cases. The court's adherence to the previously adopted
insurer liability theory could lead to an inequitable result, however, because
the manufacturer could be deprived of the insurance coverage for which the
manufacturer had paid. Although it is impossible to determine whether a court
will adhere strictly to its original insurer liability theory when it is confronted
with a different pattern of insurance coverage, both the injurious exposure and
the manifestation theories are flawed because they inevitably lead to either in-
consistent or inequitable results in later cases.
The continuous trigger theory of Keene, however, permits a court to inter-
pret the CGL policy to promote coverage without leading to inconsistent
results in subsequent cases. Because the entire injurious process from exposure
through manifestation triggers coverage,'" the court need not change its inter-
pretation of when coverage triggering "bodily injury" occurs in an effort to
promote coverage. The court can apply the continuous trigger theory re-
gardless of the manufacturer's historical pattern of insurance coverage. The
facts of Eagle-Picher are illustrative of how the continuous trigger theory avoids
the inconsistent decisions/inequitable result dilemma. For the purpose of this
analysis, it is assumed that the injurious process for the claimants' diseases ex-
tended until after 1968. Eagle-Picher began purchasing insurance coverage in
1968. 320 Under the continuous trigger theory of Keene, insurance coverage is
triggered at all times during the injurious process."' Since Eagle-Picher held
insurance coverage during at least a part of the injurious process, this in-
surance coverage would be triggered, and the manufacturer would be insured
for the underlying asbestos-related disease claims. If the manufacturer's pat-
tern of insurance purchase is changed, however, so that Eagle-Picher is insured
from 1931 until 1968 and uninsured thereafter, the result remains the same.
The manufacturer would be insured under the Keene court's continuous trigger
theory, because the manufacturer held insurance during the injurious process.
In summary, a court's effort to promote insurance coverage, while applying
either an injurious exposure or manifestation theory, leads inevitably to incon-
3 " Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1219, 1221
(6th Cir. 1980); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. at 117-18
(D. Mass. 1981).
"" See text and notes at notes 110-19, 147-67 supra for the discussion of the factors con-
sidered by the courts.
119 Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
320 Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. at 111 (D. Mass.
1981).
321 Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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sistent results. If a court adopts the Keene court's continuous trigger theory,
however, it can interpret the policies to promote coverage, while maintaining
consistency in its decisions.
After the court determines which insurance policies are triggered under
the continuous triggering theory, the court must then allocate liability among
the insurers whose coverage is triggered. Liability must be allocated to ensure
that a single insurer will not be unfairly burdened with full liability. 322 Once an
insurer's policy is found applicable, the insured manufacturer is permitted to
collect from that insurer the full amount of indemnity that is due under the
policy. 323
 After indemnifying the insured manufacturer up to the policy's
limits, 324 the targeted insurer may recover from the other insurers any amount
the targeted insurer paid in excess of its allocated liability. 525 One method of
allocating ultimate liability under the continuous trigger theory is pro rata ap-
portionment, 326 based on the amount of time the insurer provided coverage
during the injurious process as a proportion of the entire injurious process
period. 3" For example, if the entire injurious process extends for 30 years and
three insurers provided coverage to the manufacturer during this time, each for
a ten-year period, then each insurer would be ultimately liable for one-third of
the total judgment.
When the manufacturer has not been insured continuously during the in-
jurious process, the liability allocation issue is more complex. Although in-
surance coverage is triggered at any point in the injurious process under the
continuous trigger theory, 328 a manufacturer might not be relieved of all liabili-
ty even if the coverage provisions of one of the policies it holds are triggered."'
Judge Wald, in her Keene concurrence, correctly asserted that the manufacturer
should bear a portion of the loss if the manufacturer was voluntarily uninsured
for a part of the injurious process."° This assertion, in the majority of cases,
would be in accord with the notion that the reasonable expectations of the in-
sured should be honored. 33 ' In allocating liability, the courts should honor the
objectively reasonable expectations of the insured. 332 This objective standard
would produce an essential degree of certainty and predictability about the par-
322 Id. at 1050.
323 Id.
324 Id.
54s
	 recovery could be executed under either the "other insurance" provisions of the
CGL policy, id., or the doctrine of contribution. Id. at 1050 n.35.
"6 Id. at 1058 (Wald, J., concurring).
347 This insurer liability scheme is similar to the one adopted by the Forty-Eight court ex-
cept, in that case, the years of exposure provided the basis for allocation. Insurance Co. of N.
Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1224 (6th Cir. 1980). See supra note 125.
"" Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
329
	 at 1058 (Wald, J., concurring).
330 Id. (Wald, J., concurring).
33 ' Id. (Wald, J., concurring).
3" R. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV.
961, 967 (1970).
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ties' legal rights. 333 If the manufacturer decided not to purchase insurance con-
tinually throughout the process of injury, the manufacturer could not
reasonably expect to be fully indemnified,'" unless there is some indication
that the insurer should be held responsible for all legal liability. The cir-
cumstances of a particular case will determine the reasonableness of the in-
sured's belief that it is insured for all legal liability.
The facts of the Eagle-Picher case will help to illustrate this proposition.
Eagle-Picher manufactured asbestos-containing products between 1931 and
1971. 3" Prior to 1968, Eagle-Picher was uninsured for the underlying
asbestosis and related claims. 336 During the years after 1971, the manufacturer
ceased to produce asbestos-containing materials but it continued to purchase,
in increasing amounts, insurance coverage for damages caused by asbestos ex-
posure."' The manufacturer would be insured under the continuous trigger
theory, since the manufacturer held insurance during the injurious process. 338
The court would still have to allocate liability between the manufacturer and
the insurer whose coverage was triggered, because the manufacturer was
voluntarily uninsured for 37 years of the injurious process. 339
In allocating the liability between the manufacturer and the insurer, the
court should look to the reasonable expectations of the parties. 34° A court ap-
plying the continuous trigger theory to the facts of Eagle-Picher could find that
the parties' reasonable expectations were that the insurer was underwriting
coverage for the entire injurious process period. In determining the reasonable
expectations of the manufacturer regarding the extent of insurance coverage,
the courts should examine the manufacturer's historical pattern of insurance
purchases and the premiums paid for the insurance. In Eagle-Picher, the
manufacturer was uninsured for a portion of the injurious process but later
decided to purchase insurance coverage."' If the insured paid higher
premiums than would otherwise be charged, the higher premiums might be an
indication that the insurer agreed to underwrite coverage for the previously un-
covered portion of the injurious process, or at least that the insured could
reasonably expect full coverage. If the court concludes that it is reasonable for
"' Id. at 968.
334 Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Wald,
J., concurring).
3 's Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. at 111 (D. Mass.
1981).
336 Id.
5" Id. at 118.
"a Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Id. at 1058 (Wald, J., concurring). In Eagle-Picher, the court found, based on the pat-
tern of insurance purchase, that the manifestation theory must closely approximate the expecta-
tions of the contracting parties. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 523 F.
Supp. at 118 (D. Mass. 1981). Therefore, the court found that the manufacturer was fully in-
sured. Id.
340 Id.
341 Id.
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the manufacturer to expect full insurance coverage even though the manufac-
turer was voluntarily uninsured for part of the injurious process, then the court
should not allocate any of the ultimate liability to the manufacturer.
A manufacturer could also expect full coverage if the manufacturer has
ceased producing the injurious product and is unable to acquire continued in-
surance. For example, Keene Corporation manufactured thermal insulation
products that contained asbestos from 1948 until 1972. 342 As a practical matter,
Keene was uninsured after 1976, because its insurer began using large deduct-
ibles and administrative fees for handling asbestos-damage claims. 343 Assum-
ing that the manufacturer was continuously insured until 1976, the manufac-
turer's inability to obtain insurance coverage after that date, Judge Wald
reasoned, should not defeat the expectations of full insurance coverage.'"
Under these circumstances, the manufacturer has not voluntarily assumed risk
during the period when the diseases progressed. Therefore, it seems equitable
to apportion all liability among those who insured the manufacturer, because
only they have voluntarily assumed the risk of liability during the injurious
process."'
Unless theie are indications that the insured could reasonably expect to be
free from all legal liability, the continuous trigger theory requires that a
manufacturer maintain continuous coverage to be assured of full indemnifica-
tion. 346
 A manufacturer may be voluntarily uninsured for some or all of the in-
jurious process, either because it is self-insured or because it is not aware of the
specific risks involved with the use of its product. Self-insurance is a risk reten-
tion plan."' A self-insured manufacturer, instead of purchasing insurance,
charges a higher price for its products and deposits the additional proceeds
from the higher price into a fund. 348
 Any legal liability incurred by the
manufacturer, which otherwise would have been covered by insurance, is paid
out of this fund. 349
 In essence, the manufacturer insures itself. The manufac-
turer voluntarily assumes the risk of liability during the period in which it is
self-insured."° Therefore, it should be liable as an insurer would be for this
self-insured period."' A manufacturer also may be uninsured if it is unaware
of a specific risk connected with the use of its product. The manufacturer's lack
of knowledge about every risk involved in his product does not insulate that
manufacturer from the need to have continuous coverage. Insurance, which is
founded on the concept of risk, is a rational device to protect against such ig-
3"
 Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
34' Id. at 1045 n.21.
'44 Id. at 1058 (Wald, J., concurring).
3" Id. (Wald, J., concurring).
3" Id. (Wald, J., concurring).
347 KEETON, itzpra note 49, at S 1.2(b)(6).
"a Id.
349 Id.
85° Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
(Wald, J., concurring).
"' Id.
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norance. 352 Thus, the manufacturer should obtain liability insurance even if it
does not know about a specific risk, such as the risk of developing asbestosis
from exposure to asbestos, because the manufacturer should know that some
type of liability might arise from using any of its products. If the manufacturer
does not obtain insurance because it is unaware of a specific risk, then the
manufacturer could not reasonably expect to be fully insured. In every instance
when the manufacturer is uninsured for a portion of the injurious process, the
court should be guided, in allocating liability, by the insured's objectively
reasonable expectations.
CONCLUSION
Courts have developed two main theories for determining insurer liability
in the insidious disease area manifestation and injurious exposure. While
these two theories have been the most widely applied in the area of asbestos-
related diseases, a third theory was recently adopted by the District of Colum-
bia Circuit in Keene Corporation v. Insurance Company of North America. This
theory, the "continuous trigger" theory, combines features of both the
manifestation and injurious exposure approaches. The continuous trigger
theory of Keene, however, avoids many of the problems encountered in the
separate application of the other two theories, and provides certainty of
coverage to the manufacturer. The continuous trigger theory should eliminate
the need for insurance companies to argue conflicting theories in different cases
depending upon their economic interests in a particular case. In addition the
more comprehensive definition of when coverage is triggered should preserve
judicial integrity by allowing the courts to apply the theory consistently,
regardless of the factual pattern in the case. Liability should be allocated
among all those insurers that provided coverage to the manufacturer during the
injurious process. This allocation should be pro rata, based on the portion of
the injurious process during which an insurer provided coverage. When the
manufacturer is uninsured, it must bear a portion of the liability, unless the
manufacturer reasonably could expect to be free from all liability. This in-
surance coverage trigger and liability allocation scheme comports with the
reasonable expectations of the insured and should be applied in all future in-
sidious disease cases.
STEPHEN V. GIMIGLIANO
332 KEETON, supra note 49 at S 1.2(b)(2).
